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**Human Rights Monitoring and Institution-building
in Post-conflict Societies:
The Role of Human Rights Field Operations**

by Ian Martin

**Human Rights Centre
University of Essex¹**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not of USAID.

"The connection between human rights and peace and security is laid out in the Charter and has been amply confirmed by recent experience. An analysis of developments and trends in the area of human rights should be incorporated in the early warning activities of the organization; human rights are a key element in peace-making and peace-building efforts and should be addressed in the context of humanitarian operations."

— Kofi Annan, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, July 1997.²

In recent years, the key role of human rights protection in peace-making and peace-building has been reflected in the establishment of substantial human rights field operations in a number of countries, by the United Nations, by the UN jointly with a regional organization, or by a regional organization alone. In some cases this has occurred before peace negotiations have been concluded, to pave the way to a settlement, and the operation has then remained to help build the peace. In other cases, the human rights field operation has been deployed when armed conflict has already ended. Despite many difficulties encountered in these early operations, their experience confirms the valuable role they can play. Yet the human rights dimension is as yet only partially and inadequately incorporated in the post-conflict strategies of which it should be a part, and international organizations and donor governments must strengthen the organizational and funding arrangements necessary for its fuller realization.

The Development of Human Rights Field Operations

The pioneering human rights field operation was in **El Salvador**. UN-brokered peace negotiations led to commitments by both government and armed opposition to respect human rights and invite UN verification of their observance. In July 1991 the human rights division of ONUSAL was established, with an international staff of 101, including 42 human rights observers. The huge UN Transitional Administration in **Cambodia**, established in February 1992, initially provided for 10 human rights officers (out of a total UNTAC deployment of some 20,000). This was later increased so that there was one human rights officer in each province and a substantial headquarters and training staff. The Human Rights Component, however, remained a relatively small one.

The Organization of American States established a small International Civilian Mission under military rule in **Haiti** in September 1992. In February 1993 this was absorbed into a large joint UN–OAS human rights mission (MICIVIH). The UN–OAS budget for MICIVIH provided for 280 international staff. At its peak before its first evacuation in October 1993, it reached around 200, the largest human rights presence in any single country up to that time. This was

exceeded in **Guatemala**, where peace negotiations led to a human rights verification mission (MINUGUA) established in November 1994, with an authorized strength of 245 international staff, including 10 military liaison officers and 60 civilian police observers.

These four human rights field presences had their origins in attempts to negotiate and oversee political transitions. Part of a new generation of UN peace operations, they were conceptualized and mounted by the UN's political departments in New York, in virtual isolation from its human rights mechanisms and supporting staff in the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva.

By the time the proposal to create the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) was debated prior to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the disconnection between the New York initiatives and the Geneva-based system was well-remarked. Bridging that gulf was a major motive of those who lobbied for the creation of the post. The General Assembly resolution that established the post in December 1993 made no explicit reference to peace-keeping and human rights field operations, but gave the HCHR the responsibility "to coordinate the human rights promotion and protection activities throughout the UN system," and "to rationalize, adapt, strengthen, and streamline the UN machinery in the field of human rights with a view to improving its efficiency and effectiveness".³

The first high commissioner, José Ayala-Lasso, took up his post on 5 April 1994. The next day, genocide was unleashed in **Rwanda**. The high commissioner visited Rwanda and called for a special session of the Commission on Human Rights. This mandated a special rapporteur on Rwanda, and requested the high commissioner "to make the necessary arrangements for the Special Rapporteur to be assisted by a team of human rights field officers." Initially a small team was envisaged. Subsequently the high commissioner appealed for funding for a team of 21. During a second visit to Rwanda in late August he agreed with the government that as many as 147 officers would be deployed, corresponding to the 147 communes of the country. This Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) depended on voluntary funding (rather than the UN regular or peace-keeping budgets, from which the New York-run operations were funded. That, together with the lack of Geneva-based systems or experience for mounting a large field operation, resulted in painfully slow deployment. The figure of 147 was never reached. By February 1995 there were 85 officers. Later that year the operation reached a peak of about 130 international staff.

HRFOR was the first large human rights field operation responsible to the high commissioner in Geneva, rather than to the political or peace-keeping departments in New York. The high commissioner became personally convinced that the future of human rights lay in the field. By the time of his resignation in February 1997, he was responsible for human rights field offices in 11 countries in all regions.⁴ In addition to Rwanda, these included substantial presences in two other major conflict or post-conflict situations, Cambodia and Burundi, and a lesser role in a third, the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

The office of the HCHR in **Cambodia** is the only field presence where funding has been fully incorporated in the regular budget of the UN. The Human Rights Component of UNTAC lobbied for the continuation of its work beyond UNTAC's withdrawal, and this passed to the Centre for Human Rights after a hiatus, since the Centre had had no involvement during the peace-keeping operation. As of mid-1997, it had an international staff of 17, including those engaged in a judicial mentor program.

The office of the HCHR in **Burundi** is intended to be the largest of the Geneva-run field presences after Rwanda. It began as a technical cooperation effort, intended as "preventive action." In June 1995, however, the government agreed to the deployment of 35 human rights monitors. Owing to funding delays, this deployment began only in April 1996. By mid-1997, 15 observers had been deployed, with the intention of further expansion toward the agreed 35.

The Human Rights Field Operation in **Former Yugoslavia** is a misnomer, not only because it does not cover all the territory implied, but also because it invites inappropriate comparison of the role of its 12 international staff with larger field operations. Following the Dayton Agreement, the main human rights monitoring mandate for **Bosnia and Herzegovina** was bestowed upon the OSCE. That left it to the high commissioner to define for himself a threefold contribution: conducting human rights training for international personnel, making available human rights experts to the High Representative, and supporting the work of the Special Rapporteur and Expert on Missing Persons.

The HCHR also has a small foothold in two more post-conflict situations. The government of **Zaire** signed an agreement in August 1996 accepting a two-person human rights office, the functions of which include monitoring, technical cooperation, and training, both for governmental institutions and NGOs. This had been recommended by the Special Rapporteur on Zaire and supported by the Commission on Human Rights. Its future in the Democratic Republic of Congo remains to be determined. The office in **Abkhazia, Georgia**, consists of a single UN professional, working in tandem with a single OSCE official. But it set an important structural precedent. It was funded as part of the peace-keeping presence, yet reports to the HCHR through the head of the UN Mission, UNOMIG.

While the HCHR's field presences were being extended, the case for the more consistent incorporation of human rights components in multidimensional UN peace operations was being pressed.⁵ Other such operations, including UNAVEM III in **Angola**, UNOMIL in **Liberia** and UNTAES in **Eastern Slavonia**, had human rights officers included in their staffing. UNTAES had failed to establish a human rights unit until the summer of 1997, UNOMIL had three human rights officers, while UNAVEM III had 14 officers in place in early 1997, when a major expansion of the human rights presence (to over 50 officers, nearly half of them UN Volunteers) was recommended for the follow-on operation, MONUA. Elsewhere, the mandate for human rights monitoring was given to a regional organization: as noted, in addition to OAS participation in the joint OAS/UN mission in **Haiti**, the OSCE became responsible for human rights monitoring in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and assumed joint responsibility with the UN in **Abkhazia, Georgia**.

It is too early to reach any definitive or overall evaluation of even the first generation of human rights field operations, while only El Salvador and Cambodia are concluded. However, it is certainly not too early to regret the absence of on-going evaluation within the UN system which would contribute to an eventual assessment, while in the meantime enabling some clear lessons to be learned and applied in later phases or operations.⁶ An interim evaluation can currently be informed by comparative assessments made outside the UN⁷, writings by those who have participated in such operations⁸ and external studies by NGOs.⁹ Most of the existing literature is focused on the early phases of operations and thus unable to assess the longer-term institution-building role of the operations and already somewhat outdated.

Peace-keeping Operations and Human Rights

Any situation that requires a peace-keeping operation also demands close attention to the human rights situation. There should therefore be either a human rights component within the operation, or a strong relationship of cooperation with a human rights field presence managed outside the peace-keeping operation itself.

Human Rights Within and Outside Peace-keeping Operations

The multi-donor Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda noted retrospectively that "peace-keeping operations did not acquire a human rights component until after the crisis had erupted" and that "with only a small civilian police unit and no human rights cell, the mission [UNAMIR] had very limited ability to investigate violent incidents."¹⁰ This was despite the fact that the special rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, who had visited Rwanda in April 1993, had recommended in his report that a mechanism for the protection of civilian populations against massacres should be set up. That mechanism, he suggested, should include international teams of human rights observers and a civilian police force.¹¹ The Arusha Peace Agreement itself provided for a "Neutral International Force," which, in addition to supervising the integration of the armed forces of the two parties to the civil war, would "guarantee the overall security of the country and especially verify the maintenance of law and order by the competent authorities and organs," "assist in catering for the security of civilians," and "assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country."¹² Yet when the peace-keeping operation, UNAMIR, was mandated by the Security Council in October 1993, the mandate was more limited. The secretary-general was pressed by member states to make the maximum economies and reduction in its strength. No human rights component or officers were included.

The Role of Civilian Police

UN civilian police have a crucial human rights role to play wherever they are deployed, and UN human rights components have benefited from working alongside them. Both sides have usually had difficulty in defining their respective roles and reconciling their organizational

cultures, but have also gained much from cooperation and joint action.¹³ UN civilian police operations have played major human rights roles in **Namibia, Mozambique, and Bosnia and Herzegovina**, where there were no or few UN human rights staff. MINUGUA in Guatemala is unique in incorporating police and military officers fully under the civilian direction of a human rights mission.

Recruitment of substantial numbers of civilian police is difficult, since unlike military personnel they are not standing by for deployment by units. It is even more difficult to ensure that those recruited by individual governments are well trained in respect for human rights in law enforcement in their own countries and that when they become UN personnel they will act and encourage others to act in accordance with international standards. Some are drawn from countries where the police engage in frequent human rights abuses. Even those from countries with a tradition of democratic policing are often unaware of international criminal justice and human rights standards. It is therefore essential that police available for international service are identified ahead of time and given appropriate training in their own countries; that high standards are applied in the selection (a requirement that may conflict with the need to assemble a large force rapidly); that the UN provide clear guidance on international criminal justice and human rights standards; and that high priority be given to training in the peace-keeping operation after deployment.

Military Peace-keepers and Human Rights

The first requirement of the military is to act fully in accordance with international humanitarian law. This needs to be incorporated in training and instructions. Military peace-keepers are less directly engaged in law enforcement than civilian police, but in practice may find themselves involved in internal security functions to which human rights standards are more relevant than humanitarian law. Some human rights training is therefore a necessary part of their preparation. They may be witnesses to human rights violations by the military or other agents of the host government, or by armed opposition or other groups. They need to have been given guidance as to whether their mandate does or does not provide for them to intervene, and how to report what they have witnessed. In no cases should UN personnel remain silent witnesses to human rights violations. The responsibility and channels for reporting must be clear to them.

Monitoring the Human Rights Performance of Peace-keepers

The extent to which UN peace-keepers act in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards needs to be kept under adequate scrutiny. After troops from three NATO countries have been accused of serious human rights violations in Somalia, there can be no complacency that this will automatically be the case. It is sometimes suggested that the human rights component of a peace-keeping operation should have the responsibility of investigating allegations of abuses by UN military or police, but this is to place too great a strain on working relationships. The position of a UN human rights unit with a monitoring mandate certainly becomes impossible, however, if alleged violations by UN personnel are not investigated.

Separate arrangements for this must exist and operate with transparency.

Such arrangements have yet to be incorporated satisfactorily in UN peace-keeping operations. A still greater challenge exists in the developing practice of the UN authorizing or operating alongside interventions by a regional organization or ad hoc group of states. For example, ECOMOG, the West African peace-keepers sent to Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has been accused of responsibility for human rights abuses. Despite the presence of a small UN operation, UNOMIL, with a mandate to investigate human rights violations, it was not clear how there could be effective accountability in such circumstances. Some arrangements for scrutiny and investigations ought to exist in every case, but this runs counter to the desire of members of the Security Council to promote alternatives to UN military operations and to avoid the use of their own forces.

Human Rights Institution-Building in Post-Conflict Societies

The Relationship Between Human Rights Monitoring and Institution-building

In general, human rights field operations should be conceived as integrating preventive, monitoring (verification) and assistance (technical cooperation, institution- or capacity-building) functions. This has not been the view of all analysts. A USAID study argued that "attempting to reform a legal system may not be well-suited to transitional bodies such as human rights monitoring missions."¹⁴ Others have suggested, with some justification, that in the case of Rwanda the operation initially attempted to usurp functions properly those of UNDP. But in relation to the administration of justice, there is a complementarity between UNDP's long-term project management capability, the criminal justice expertise of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, and the capacity of a human rights field operation to make available professional human rights expertise and utilize its unique outreach to identify needs and be supportive at the local level. This has enabled field operations to play an important role in developing justice systems.

It can be argued that carrying on these two types of activities in tandem could threaten each. Monitoring inevitably creates a conflictive relationship with the government, poisoning the climate for cooperation. Institution-building may produce too close a relationship with government, undermining the willingness to maintain tough-minded monitoring. The overwhelming consensus of those who have had responsibility for human rights field operations in post-conflict situations is, on the contrary, that the relationship is an overwhelmingly positive one.¹⁵ In an integrated operation, the monitoring identifies needs for training and resources, the technical cooperation ensures that those needs can be addressed, and the monitoring again provides feedback on the effectiveness of technical cooperation projects in improving aspects of the human rights situation to which they are directed. Certainly in a situation where institutions have been destroyed or have never existed, such as post-genocide Rwanda, to point to human rights violations while offering no linkage to assistance is to invite dismissal, and to pursue technical cooperation while ignoring serious on-going violations is naive and unacceptable.

As one human rights director wrote of the El Salvador experience:

"...human rights monitoring and institution-building were inextricably linked. This relationship is, without doubt, the key to an operation of this kind which goes beyond the mere proving and denouncing of violations or of traditional technical assistance programs which often have no relation to practical results or people's daily lives."¹⁶

Police, Prisons, and Judicial Reform

The key requirement for a post-conflict society is a functioning criminal justice system capable of maintaining order while respecting human rights— a well-trained civilian police force, an independent judiciary, and humane prison and detention facilities. Typically, these existed to only a limited extent if at all before the conflict. To the extent they had existed, they were militarized, politicized, or destroyed by the conflict. And they face serious criminality in a society unable fully to integrate ex-combatants or to prevent ready access to arms.

The first conditions for a civilian police force are a process of recruitment that screens out abusers and selects those with the attitudes and abilities appropriate to democratic policing, and a high quality training programme that includes a strong human rights component. However, the overall quality of training and the resources with which the police are equipped are as important to their respect for human rights in practice as the specific human rights content of their training. Unless police are able to prevent and detect crime by acceptable methods, the pressures to resort to abuse will quickly undermine any human rights training.

Overall training of new police forces has usually been undertaken on a bilateral basis. For example, the United States (through ICITAP, the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) conducted training in El Salvador and Haiti, Spain did training in Guatemala, and France offered training in Cambodia. An international civilian police presence can play a mentoring and monitoring role, as UN CIVPOL have done in Haiti and for a more limited time in El Salvador. In Bosnia the IPTF mandate extends to vetting and downsizing, and since late 1996 to investigating human rights violations by police.

A human rights field presence can contribute to human rights training, as the Office of the UN Centre for Human Rights has done in Cambodia, as HRFOR has done with both the Gendarmerie and the Communal Police in Rwanda, and as MICIVIH has done by teaching a course on police ethics based on UN standards for law enforcement agents for the Haitian National Police (HNP). It can also undertake monitoring supportive of senior officers seeking to check incipient abuse, and can work to strengthen internal control mechanisms, such as the office of the inspector general in the HNP.

Creating a new police force is a long-term undertaking, but building a strong and independent judicial system is an even longer-term task. The experience to date has not been

happy. Competition among bilateral donors has been insensitive to local legal and cultural traditions, and to the need for the national government, legal community, and civil society to define their own needs.

Multilateral donors are also not well equipped. UNDP should play the coordinating role, but has lacked the expertise at headquarters and country levels to do so effectively. It has been slow to define and develop the human rights content of its governance programs. Human rights field operations cannot substitute for the role major donors need to play. But they have played an important role in making known to the national justice ministry and potential donors the realities of the state of the justice system. They can also support reform efforts through the regular contacts of legally trained staff with local judicial officials, and provide feedback on the impact or lack of impact of assistance and training programs. The most extensive such effort is the judicial mentor program in Cambodia, conceived by the Human Rights Component of UNTAC. As well as advice on day-to-day functioning of the courts, this program offers human rights training to local officials, as do the human rights field operations in Haiti and Rwanda. To varying extents, all human rights field operations have been involved in developing central programs of reform with the respective ministries of justice.

The needs of the judiciary and the police are generally well recognized by donors. There is less immediate readiness to assist in reform of penal administration and improvement of prison conditions, yet this should be seen as the third and equally essential leg of the criminal justice system. Not only is the humane treatment of prisoners a major human rights issue in itself, but efforts to reform the police and courts will be quickly undermined if detainees are not delivered to courts and convicted prisoners do not serve their sentences. Human rights field operations have played a particularly important role in arousing concern and encouraging assistance to prisons, since this emerges inevitably from their monitoring of unacceptable conditions of detention. For example, in Haiti MICIVIH developed a prison reform project in collaboration with UNDP, the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division and USAID.

National Human Rights Institutions, NGOs, and Human Rights Education

Human rights field operations will and should always have a limited life. However, the task of developing institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights is a long-term one, in which the role of civil society as well as government is crucial. Short-term human rights operations must consciously seek to avoid displacing indigenous human rights activity, and do all they can to support and encourage it. The extent to which nongovernmental organizations can be directly associated in their work will vary, according to the political and security context, and according to different areas of activity. Human rights promotion is usually best implemented by local actors, with international operations playing only a supporting role. International and local actors should normally maintain their autonomy in monitoring and investigation. The international operation should plan for the sustainability of human rights protection beyond its own withdrawal. This will be facilitated if a UN human rights presence is not completely withdrawn at the end of a peace-keeping operation. A limited presence can be sustained under the

mandate of the HCHR.

Some post-conflict societies (El Salvador, Guatemala) have had vigorous NGO activity throughout the conflict. Others (Rwanda) had active NGOs but saw them severely weakened by the conflict. Still others (Cambodia) never had a civil society. The Human Rights Component of UNTAC played a key role in stimulating and assisting, through Asian and western NGOs, the establishment and development of NGOs in Cambodia. There has tended to be greater tension where an active civil society preceded the international presence. Human rights field operations have not always given the priority they should have to working with NGOs. NGOs, for their part, are not always understanding of the constraints of an intergovernmental organization, nor quick to adapt their own role as the country moves from a conflict to a post-conflict situation. Exit strategies are hard to plan when field operations have an uncertain life. However MICIVIH, for example, has undertaken training efforts with Haitian NGOs to try to transfer aspects of its experience before its mandate ends.

The opportunities to support the development of national human rights institutions established by governments or parliaments, but, it is hoped, with full guarantees of independence, have varied greatly. They have so far been very limited in Cambodia, Haiti and Rwanda. In El Salvador, ONUSAL worked closely to strengthen and transfer tasks to the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights. In Guatemala, MINUGUA gave priority to strengthening the Office of the Human Rights Counsel (or ombudsman).

There is general agreement that developing a culture of respect for human rights is at the heart of institutionalizing human rights protection, but it is much harder to analyze how strategic contributions can be made toward this end and to evaluate the effects of activities. Among the human rights field operations, UNTAC's Human Rights Component embarked on the most extensive human rights education program. In El Salvador there was a conscious decision that human rights education should largely be a field for indigenous activity. In Rwanda, HRFOR has carried out human rights education activities in three areas: formal education, training, and seminars aimed at various professional groups; popular education and mass awareness campaigns, including theatre productions and radio plays; and promotion of the rights of women, children, and other vulnerable groups. In Haiti, MICIVIH trained local trainers from civil society organizations in human rights promotion and civic education techniques. After local elections it placed increasing emphasis on local officials and state agencies.

Lessons Learned

Despite the relative novelty of efforts to incorporate the human rights dimension into post-conflict peace-building, several lessons are sufficiently clear to require reflection in the planning of multilateral and bilateral agencies.

1. Human rights is a key element of post-conflict peace-building, essential to the durability of the peace, and an early warning if (as in Rwanda) human rights indicators reveal the post-conflict

situation is turning again into a pre-conflict situation.

2. A local human rights presence or human rights field operation can make an important contribution, not only to act as a dissuasive presence but also to diagnose the factors contributing to human rights violations and encourage and support the assistance projects necessary to address them.

3. Such a human rights field presence may appropriately be incorporated in the international community's overall peace-keeping and peace-building presence, or may stand alongside it, according to the circumstances. In either case, there should be a close working relationship with the peace operation, and in particular with any international police presence.

4. A human rights field presence should have an integrated mandate, incorporating both monitoring and institution-building, since these activities are properly complementary and mutually supportive.

5. An international human rights presence must at all times be conscious of the need to strengthen and not displace the national capacity to address human rights issues, and should have a strategy of contributing to their development as it plans towards its own downsizing and departure.

6. Institution-building is a long-term task, not susceptible to the quick fix. It will continue long beyond any temporary international human rights field presence. There should therefore be close cooperation with those agencies, most notably UNDP, whose presence will continue. The involvement of the Office of the HCHR during the peace-keeping and peace-building mandate will also allow for longer-term human rights institution-building to be sustained.

7. The coordination of the work of multilateral and bilateral agencies in the field of human rights institution-building must be improved. UNDP and the Office of the HCHR both have key roles to play, and require a strengthening of their professional resources at headquarters and in-country for this purpose. The HCHR has been asked by the secretary-general to carry out an analysis of the technical assistance provided by the UN entities in areas related to human rights. This should give rise to proposals for improving complementarity of action both within the UN system and with other multilateral and bilateral donors in post-conflict situations.

8. The Office of the HCHR should be strengthened in its capacity to give professional direction to any human rights presence in the field, and to be the link between human rights operations and mechanisms and the overall political, peace-keeping, humanitarian, and development activities of the international community.

9. Donor governments should agree on funding arrangements that allow human rights field operations to be mounted and managed effectively.

10. Bilateral donors should review their own professional capacity and modalities for contributing to post-conflict human rights institution-building, especially to the training of civilian police forces, an independent justice system, and humane prison and detention facilities.

Notes

1. Previously Secretary General, Amnesty International, 1986-92; Director for Human Rights/Deputy Executive Director, UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), 1993 and 1994-95; and Chief, UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR), 1995-96.

2. *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/51/950, 14 July 1997, p.64.

3. A/RES/48/141, 20 December 1993

4. The countries were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (managed together as the Human Rights Field Operation in the former Yugoslavia, HRFOY), Abkhazia (Georgia), Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Gaza (Palestine), Rwanda, and Zaire.

5. See Amnesty International, *Peace-Keeping and Human Rights*, January 1994; and Alice Henkin (ed), *Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti*, Aspen Institute, 1995.

6. The Lessons Learned Unit in DPKO undertakes evaluations of DPKO-managed peacekeeping operations only. The European Commission has commissioned two evaluations of the European Union participation in HRFOR, carried out in mid-1995 (by Roel von Meijenfeldt) and late 1996 (by Ingrid Kircher and Paul LaRose-Edwards).

7. Alice Henkin (ed.), *Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti*, Aspen Institute, 1995, is the outcome of a comparative assessment that had the participation of UN human rights directors from the three country operations. It is being extended in 1997 to include experience from Guatemala, Rwanda, and Bosnia, as well as later experience from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti. See also studies commissioned or supported by interested governments: Stephen Golub, *Strengthening Human Rights Monitoring Missions: an options paper prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, USAID*, December 1995; Paul LaRose-Edwards, *UN Human Rights Operations: Principles and Practice in United Nations Field Operations*, for the Human Rights and Justice Division, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, May 1996; Karen Kenny, *Towards Effective Training for Field Human Rights Tasks*, International Human Rights Trust, commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, Ireland, July 1996.

8. In addition to the papers by Diego García-Sayán (El Salvador), Dennis McNamara (Cambodia) and Ian Martin (Haiti) in Alice Henkin (ed.), op.cit., see: William O'Neill, "Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: the Experience of the OAS/UN Mission in Haiti," and Reed Brody, "The United Nations and Human Rights in El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution," both in *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, Vol.8, Spring 1995; and William Clarence, "The Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda: Protective Practice Evolves on the Ground," in *International Peace-Keeping*, Vol.2 No.3, Autumn 1995, and "Field Strategy for Human Rights Protection," in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol.9 No.2, 1997.
9. See two studies by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Haiti: Learning the Hard Way—The UN/OAS Human Rights Operation in Haiti 1993-94* and *Improvising History: a Critical Evaluation of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador*, both 1995; African Rights, *Rwanda, "A Waste of Hope:" The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation*, March 1995; and Amnesty International, *Rwanda and Burundi: A Call for Action by the International Community*, September 1995.
10. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.37, 78.
11. UN document E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, 11 August 1993; reproduced as Document 20 in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, UN Blue Books Series, Vol.X, 1996.
12. *Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front* (The Arusha Peace Agreement), Annex VI; reproduced as Document 19 in *The United Nations and Rwanda* (op.cit.).
13. See the comments by Diego García-Sayán, "The Experience of ONUSAL in El Salvador," in Alice Henkin (ed.), *Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti*, Aspen Institute, 1995, p.35-36; and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Improvising History: a Critical Evaluation of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador*, 1995, p.28-39.
14. Stephen Golub, op.cit., p.17.
15. This was apparent at the Aspen Institute conference "Honoring Human Rights: From Peace to Justice," 12-14 September 1997, which reviewed experience in El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Bosnia, as well as in smaller human rights field presences. The papers and recommendations from this conference are scheduled to be published in spring 1998.
16. Diego García-Sayán, "The Experience of ONUSAL in El Salvador," in Alice Henkin (ed.), op.cit., p.38.